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DERRIDA'S GOD 
Victoria Barker 
Of late, there has been a growing interest in the attention being shown by the 
French philosopher, Jacques Derrida, towards the subject of God. Indeed, his 
most recent book, Tile Gift of Death, addresses certain questions of religious 
faith directly, searching for the conceptual links between notions of religion, 
faith, mystery and responsibility. I 
Nevertheless, if one were required to place the writings of by reference to 
the oft-mentioned division of Blaise Pascal between the 'God of Abraham, the 
God of Isaac, the God of Jacob' and that of 'philosophers and scientists', then 
one's inclination would surely be to suggest that these, of all writings, fall 
squarely upon the latter side of the division. And hence, one might conclude 
that these writings held little to compel those whose theoretical interests spring 
from a religious standpoint. 
Insofar as Derrida's writings can be understood only by reflection upon 
the philosophical traditions to which they respond, there appears to lie some 
truth in the claim as to Derrida's philosophical orientation. Nevertheless, its 
difficulty lies in Derrida's firm intent to question those premises upon which 
this suggestion appears to rest: that these two approaches to God constitute 
two respective identities, which bifurcate upon the traditional division between 
faith and reason. 
The thrust of Derrida's argument, across the entire corpus of his writings, 
is that the notion of philosophical reason owes its origin and essence, its very 
possibility, to a structure of conceptuality which subtends the distinction 
between reason and faith. This structure of conceptuality - named 
'ontotheology' by Kant and more simply 'metaphysics' by Derrida- is, Derrida 
argues, a structure which is governed by principles or laws. Derrida's work is 
devoted to analysing these laws; it is an attempt to render them intelligible. 
Ontotheology, as defined by Kant, cast God as the highest and most 
originary of beings, the ground of all that is. From this account, Derrida derives 
a notion of metaphysics as any discourse that seeks to ground itself in a 
principle of ultimate presence, whether this presence be sought through a 
originality, ultimacy, totality or centrality. 
Throughout many and varied writings, Derrida attempts to clarify the 
ways in which Western philosophical, theological and other traditions depend 
upon metaphysical structures of conceptuality. This process of clarification is 
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called by Derrida 'deconstruction'. Deconstruction is a form of critique. And, as 
such, it needs an object: its process is not articulated in the abstract but in 
respect of the discourses of the Western traditions. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to delineate certain stratagems of deconstruction, as I will attempt to do here. 
One might employ a deconstructive critique, then, to analyse this division 
of philosophy and theology in respect of the alternate notions of God. A 
deconstructive critique could note the tendency of both philosophers and 
theologians to clarify this division by reference to correlated divisions between 
faith and reason, between the private and the public and so on. The 
metaphysics underlying this project could be seen to lie in part in the attempt 
to create a singular identity for the concept of God, whether it be the God of the 
Church forefathers or that of the philosophers. Each is then defined in 
opposition to, and in a hierarchical relationship over and above, its opposed 
other. 
A deconstructive critique of the notion of faith- in its relation to reason-
could proceed as follows: a private faith is of a form that it must always already 
be inhabited by that which exceeds it, that is, by a public realm wherein reason 
presides. If not by reference to a reasoned and public account of what faith 
ideally consists in, this entity would be simply unintelligible; it would not be 
recognisable for what it is- viz., a private faith. The problem facing the division 
of reason and faith is not that we are unable to determine whether to place 
religious belief upon the side of either faith or reason. It is rather that the 
blurring of the very distinction between faith and reason is the condition of the 
possibility of the identifiability of faith as such. 
A related critique, by the way, might be offered of the notion of reason- in 
its relation to faith - in the writings of the Western philosophers. This critique 
might, for example, evidence the manner in which reason depends upon a 
prior investment in faith, as the grounds upon which reason is endowed with 
the priority that it is. 
The critique is not dissimilar to the critique of the notion of the private 
language offered by Wittgenstein, but Derrida wishes to push it further. He 
wishes to suggest that all Western thought and the writings that emerge from it 
- its theological, religious and even its mystical writings included - maintain 
structural investments that he identifies with onto-theology or metaphysics. 
And thus, to employ Derrida's metaphor, Athens lies in a closer proximity to 
Jerusalem than Pascal's formula admits; the edifices of each rest upon related 
principles of structural support.2 
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This being so, I wish to consider what deconstructive critique can offer us 
by way of an analysis of that term so foundational to this division of faith and 
reason: the very term 'God'. 
Without claiming to capture what Pascal may himself have ir.tended by 
drawing this distinction, Jet us note that, across the traditions of Western 
philosophy and theology, God marks that place of a very singular polyvalence. 
There could be few terms so overdetermined as this term 'God', so richly 
invested with signification and yet so subject to semantic slippage. 
Within Christian theologies, upon which I will concentrate, two alternate 
conceptualisations of God stand out, reducing the polyvalence to an uneasy 
ambivalence. The ambivalence lies between two overarching definitions of 
God. On the one hand, we have God as ultimate and supreme being. This God 
of positive theology embraces the totality of being and so is a presence that is 
full to excess; everything bespeaks His presence. This is God as the One and 
only true Being. On the other hand, we have God as a transcendent Being, a 
Being that unfolds beyond history, beyond time. This God of negative theology 
transgresses being and so He is ultimately unknowable, unsayable; nothing 
bespeaks His presence. This is God as the wholly Other, the Being beyond 
beings. 
Given Derrida's interest in metaphysical structures, it is surely not 
unexpected that he should come to focus on this play of presence and absence 
that defines God in Western thought. The interactions and prevarications 
between these two principles of ultimate intelligibility -of intelligibility of the 
ultimate -provide a theme that is present in his writings from the first.3 
And in this context, deconstructive critique is indeed clarifying. It points, 
once again, to a level of conceptuality that subtends the distinction between the 
presence and absence of God. This structure is what makes it possible to speak 
of God as at once both the ultimate One and the wholly Other. By focussing 
upon the schema - Derrida calls it a logic or an economy - that produces these 
alternate characterisations, a deconstructive critique is enabled to show how 
these alternate characterisations reflect each other, as inverse products of the 
same metaphysics. 
There is a further aspect of the deconstructive critique which emerged in 
our consideration of faith and reason; this will be useful to our analysis of this 
ambivalent term 'God'. Derrida's writings continuously reinforce the inability 
of language to demarcate a definition or identity, of either a concept or a word. 
Because of the demand for repetition across many and varied contexts, it is in 
the very nature of language that it cannot prescribe a unity - of sense, of 
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meaning or of mark ·by reference to a determinate and articulated set of terms. 
In the process of iteration, the sign loses its grasp upon signification; semantic 
slippage is thus endemic to language and not an accidental feature of it. 
This aspect of the critique applies to the terms that are basic to the 
philosophical quest • truth, reason, goodness and so on. These terms are 
repeated across the philosophical corpus only at the price of a relentless 
deferral of that unity · of sense, of meaning or of mark · that they purport to 
capture. But it applies equally, and by the same logic, to those terms that are 
basic to a theological quest - of which the very term 'God' must surely be 
primary. 
Now how does all this relate to the issue of religious belief? The 
deconstructive critique might, I suspect, be greeted with some suspicion by 
those coming to it with a concern for their religion, particularly if we consider 
the implications of the critique of the word for our term 'God'. 
The difficulty for religion concerns the relation of God to those signs by 
which we may be taken to know Him, those signs which He Himself may be 
taken to constitute the ultimate author.4 Signs have commonly been 
understood, across Christian theologies, as the means by which Spirit achieves 
self-realisation. This is the account that underscores notion of the veracity of 
the Word of God, the truth of His revelation. U what Derrida says of language 
is true, then it appears that God is unable to secure the sense and meaning of 
those terms by which we refer to Him. This is so whether the signs of God are 
supplied by natural theology or by revealed theology. 
For the religious, there must surely be a certain poignancy in the fact that 
even the authorial presence of a being such as this cannot secure the 
perspicacity of His own name. In this respect, it is possible to understand the 
notion of God as lying within our philosophical and theological perspectives as 
a site of utmost paradoxicality • if not outright irony. 
Kevin Hart attempts to find a way out of this apparent difficulty by 
noting, quite correctly, that deconstruction is a critique of the use to which the 
word 'God' is ,put. Derrida does not call into question the notion of God as 
such, but only those notions which presume His full presence in our 
representations of Him. And this, he argues, cannot count against the belief in 
God as such. Our words may fail to capture Him, but this need not undermine 
our faith in Him.s 
For Derrida, however, the situation is not resolved by focussing upon the 
distinction between God as such and those names that we use to refer • albeit 
imperfectly - to Him; the distinction between God and 'God' is simply 
untenable. For the presence of God is only thinkable by us by reference to His 
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names. There is simply no possibility of reaching behind our representations of 
God to locate a God in which to place one's faith . There is no God but 'God'; 
our access to God is thinkable only within the limits of conceptuality itself. I do 
not think is misleading to state that for Derrida, there is no God as such. 
Christian theology thus appears to be challenged by a fundamental 
dilemma. We cannot speak of God except by reference to His names and yet we 
are unable to name that God to which we refer in our religious claims. If the 
very term 'God' cannot name what God is, then God is ultimately unnameable. 
And, worse still perhaps, insofar as our representations of God manifest the 
possibilities of our conceptualisation of God, we have a God who is not merely 
unnameable, but unthinkable also. Indeed, and paradoxically, the very term 
'God' might be taken to capture the ultimate principle of this unsayability of 
God. 
One response to this apparent dilemma has been to focus upon the 
possibilities that a negative theology supplies, affirming that no speech 
properly pertains to God, since He is wholly Other.6 According to this 
approach, the best we can do is speak of what is not Him. One might 
reasonably be concerned, however, that too exclusive a focus upon the negative 
theological approach leaves our talk of God so circumscribed as to reduce God 
to a place in the void. 
The issue of negative theology cannot be dismissed lightly -its relations to 
deconstruction have inspired a wealth of literature.7 I shall merely note my 
own concern with this response, by questioning whether the negative 
deconstructive turn in theology renders our theologies in a certain sense 
vacuous. Even if condoned by the mystics, a purely negative theological 
approach appears to undermine our entitlement to speak of God in those ways 
which capture what the religious commonly want to say about Him. Is a God 
about which we can truly say nothing a living and compassionate God? 
The difficulty of too exclusive a focus upon the negative deconstructive 
critique is that it fails to underline the positive features of the metaphysical 
framework that governs our talk of God. Rudolphe Gasche warns - directing 
his concerns to Mark C. Taylor in particular- that the negative deconstructive 
approach ignores the fact that deconstruction speaks not only of the 
disenabling conditions of language and signification, but also enabling.B In the 
theological context, the identification of the metaphysical structures is intended 
to locate the conditions of possibility of speaking of God, as well as the 
conditions of impossibility. 
There is, in other words, a difference between suggesting, on the one 
hand, that any representation of God fails to fully present Him and, on the 
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other, that God's presence is simply uruepresentable. Contrary to some recent 
American interpretations of his work, such as that of Richard Rorty, Derrida 
affirms that even the most radical singularity - which God surely is - must 
nevertheless have an identity which allows us to address Him in His very 
singularity.9 
Language allow us to inscribe this singularity within a communal history, 
a tradition of speech and writing and a shared set of questions and concerns 
that motivate it. This tradition inscribes this singularity in the very word 'God'. 
The effect of representation, of the continuing iteration of this word, is an 
overdetermined - but nevertheless recognisable - entity which we call God. 
This word 'God' marks a site of ultimate significance within our tradition. This 
site is, as Derrida notes, governed by a logic that ensures the intelligibility of 
what we want to say about Him. 
Theology is the discipline which is charged with the responsibility to 
reveal this logic. What any theology must aim for is some specification of the 
minimal conditions which will ensure that our talk of God is in fact intelligible. 
Such a theology is necessitated by the need to make any sense of alternate 
theories of God, or indeed of the messages of the Scriptures. So also, the 
intelligibility of our theological claims bespeaks a shared tradition - a logic -
that governs the concepts and words that we use when we speak of God. 
So where have we come to? We have established that, upon a deconstructive 
approach, both positive and negative theological approaches obey a structural 
logic bequeathed to us by the laws of metaphysics. Nevertheless, this may not 
seem to have got us very far, we still have the issue of the overdetermination of 
God's name to contend with. And an even more pressing problem: does this 
metaphysical play of presence and absence, reflected as it is in the play of the 
other oppositions I have mentioned, not in a certain sense limit the possibilities 
of our understanding of God? Do we not wish to move beyond these alternate 
conceptions of God? Must we remain within the confines of those theologies 
delivered down to us over the centuries? Can deconstruction make any 
substantive contribution here or is it limited to clarifying our present usage of 
this term? 
Bearing in mind the overdetermination of God's name, two points 
deserve mention, concerning the relations of deconstruction and theology. I 
make these points to support the suggestion that Derrida's philosophical 
critique, rather than clashing with the theological developments of the late 20th 
century, is surprisingly consonant with certain of its most exemplary 
tendencies. 
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The first point is this: one of the benefits of deconstruction, as it bears 
upon our understanding of God, is that it can help us to see that the notion of 
God provides a locus in which the paradoxicality of signification is most clearly 
highlighted. This gives God an exemplary role within deconstruction itself -
and within philosophy more generally. God most clearly typifies of the 
vicissitudes of the language that deconstruction itself is bound to employ. 
In the light of Derrida's readings, it is open to us to understand the notion 
of God as functioning according to an economy of language that Derrida calls 
the economy of paleonymics. The economy of paleonymics rests upon the 
concept of iterability introduced earlier. We have noted that, as a sign is 
repeated, its signification is modified to accommodate its altered context. The 
one aspect of this process is the dislodgment of signification; we have noted its 
negative effects for our understanding of the word of God. 
But this process has positive effects also, and these are indicated by the 
economy of paleonymics.lO Deconstruction recognises that our metaphysical 
determinations are always attended by an excess of signification, that the 
definition of our terms occurs in the context of a plurality, a heterogeneity of 
signification. Paleonymy refers to the process whereby new significations are 
attached to those already circumscribing the terms of our discourse, creating a 
layered or textured fabric of significance. This is the economy whereby 
conceptual change takes place. 
The point is not simply that God's name is overdetermined. The very 
name of God can be seen as a site of paleonymy, of ever increasing significance 
and an evolving interpretive wealth. For the very reason that the notion of God 
has served to found the metaphysical significance of Western discourses, so 
also, it serves to radicalise them - to open such discourses beyond the closure of 
previously determined limits. God Himself is incapable of arresting the wealth 
of interpretive possibilities that irrupt around His name. 
This leads me to my second point. The exemplary deconstructive role of 
God is reflected by an exemplary theological role. The name of God, across 
Western traditions, has functioned to found religious identities and differences, 
alliances and oppositions. One of the features of the deconstructive critique is 
its respect for the differences within and across the traditions with which it 
engages and the transformations to which they are subject. This implies that 
the God of whom one may speak in a deconstructive mode is not a God of 
closure, a God who dictates articles of faith and eternal prescriptions. He is a 
God that must be responsive to the tradition for which He is responsible. 
Once again, the point is not simply that God's name is overdetermined. It 
is rather that this overdetermination is implicit to the very essentiality of God. 
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God's essence lies in a lack of essential determination. God's essence, according 
to this line of thinking, lies neither in a full self-presence, nor in a pure absence. 
God is never wholly One or Other; He contains within Himself traces of as yet 
unknown Gods. God acts as the ultimate site of referral to othernesses still to 
come. 
It is enlightening to consider to what extent this approach to God may 
resonate with certain developments of Christian theology, particularly of the 
German scholars influenced by Karl Barth.ll The Trinitarian tendencies of 20th 
century theology tend to stress the displacement between the persons of God, 
finding in God not an undifferentiated unity but a mutuality of irreducibly 
different roles. So to cite one example, Eberhart Jiingel can speak of the unity of 
self-differentiated God, and declare that because God is love, He is essentially 
related, both in Himself, and in the sense of being related to what is different 
from Him.12 
I will not push the analogies too far, but merely note Derrida's 
deconstruction does not demand, as many postmodern philosophies appear to 
do, that we jettison this age-old notion of God. Our notion of God can continue 
serve our theologies as a site of quintessential significance, a significance whose 
singularity pivots upon an irreducible plurality. 
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